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CIVILIAN THOUGHTS ON U.C.C. SECTION 9-503 SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSION: REASONING IN A HISTORICAL VACUUM
For some time the Uniform Commercial Code has provided the
rules of sales' and security devices' in forty-nine states of the union.'
Only Louisiana, steeped in the civilian heritage of Roman,' Spanish,
and French' law, has stood alone in not adopting articles two and
nine as its positive law. This posture, however, due in part to the
pressures of uniformity, appears to be changing. In the near future
the sales provisions of the U.C.C. may become part of Louisiana's
law.' And once article two is adopted, the security interest provi-
sions of the U.C.C. surely will follow! The transition, however, may
not be smooth. One problem area is found in the U.C.C. sections con-
1. U.C.C. § 2-101 to 2-725 (1978 version).
2. U.C.C. § 9-101 to 9-507 (1978 version).
3. Between 1958 and 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in every
state except Louisiana. Eventually Louisiana enacted articles one, three, four, five,
seven, and eight. See LA. R.S. 10:1-101 to 10:5-117 (Supp. 1980); LA. R.S. 10:7-101 to
10:7-701 (Supp. 1980); LA. R.S. 10:8-101 to 10:8-501 (Supp. 1980).
4. A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM § 1 (1971); Sachse, Report to
the Louisiana Law Institute on Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part
1. 41 TUL. L. REv. 505, 506-08 (1967).
5. A. YIANNOPOULOS. supra note 4, at § 24; Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of
1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. RFV. 4 (1971): Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972);
Sweeny, Tournament of Scholars Over the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL.
L. REV. 585 (1972). See Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Specula,
tion: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV. 628 (1972).
6. See Mashaw, A Sketch of the Consequences for Louisiana Law of the Adop-
tion of "Article 2. Sales" of the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 TuL. L. REV. 740 (1968).
7. From a methodological standpoint, it is uncertain even now, when substantial
portions of the U.C.C. comprise Louisiana law, whether the commercial laws are to be
read as a true code. Chancellor Hawkland has written that civilian techniques should
be employed in reading the U.C.C. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodol.
ogy, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291. In addition, Professor Franklin noted that, "The Uniform
Commercial Code ... is largely the work of Llewellyn, who had close ties with German
civil law .... Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implica-
tions for Republican Form of Government. Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 40 TuL. L. REv. 487. 516 (1966). Moreover, Professor Franklin stated that
the U.C.C. "[r)epresents the most seif-concious attempt to veer Anglo-American legal
method from method based on prior judicial determinations to formulated law in which
such texts not only have the force of law, but enjoy the role of sources of law." Id.
Presumably, if the entire U.C.C. is enacted in Louisiana the traditional rules of civilian
interpretation will be applicable. Oddly enough, the use of civil law methodology with
respect to the Louisiana commercial laws will likely retard the reaching of the goal of
uniformity in America, which was the primary basis for the U.C.C.'s adoption.
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doning creditors' self-help repossession, particularly section 9-503.1
This article traces the jurisprudential treatment of section 9-503 in
common law jurisdictions, which consists principally of cases raising
questions regarding the constitutionality of creditors' self-help
repossession. Additionally, a forecast is projected that, notwith-
standing the constitutional analysis heretofore invoked in federal
and state courts, a creditor's self-help repossession, if ever permit-
ted in Louisiana, would be subject to a successful challenge under
the federal' or state'" constitutions.
Section 9-508: A Source of Confusion
Prior to the formulation of the U.C.C., the parties to a secured
transaction permissibly could stipulate the remedy of self-help re-
possession" in favor of the creditor in the event of the debtor's de-
fault."2 In fact, this creditor's device had been accepted as a part of
the common law." Of course, some restrictions accompanied the ex-
ercise of the repossession right. For example, self-help repossession
has been denied to creditors when their debtors filed in bankruptcy."
More significantly, the self-help repossession had to be accomplished
without breaching the peace."
8. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978 version):
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take posses-
sion of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the
debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a
place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to
both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable,
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under § 9-504.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
11. Repossession should be understood in the broad sense of creditors acting to
dispossess debtors of collateral without judicial order. Actually, not every secured
creditor who engages in self-help is perfecting a repossession. For example, a chattel
mortgagee that seizes upon the secured property without judicial approval is not
necessarily repossessing, since the mortgagee may not have ever had possession of the
collateral. Nevertheless, the principles noted in this article apply to the chattel mort-
gagee's self-help conduct,
12. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1, at 1212
(1965).
13. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 574-77 (2d ed. 1898).
14. See Lavien & Drazen, No Self-Help Repossession in Bankruptcy and
Sometimes Only Limited Court Help, 83 CoM. L.J. 502 (1978).
15. For an excellent survey of the historical and contemporary meanings of a
breach of the peace, see Comment, Breach of the Peace and Section 9-503 and the
COMMENTS
Placed in the context of article nine of the U.C.C., the self-help
repossession provision arms the creditor with great power. Article
nine's rules apply to all transactions intended to create a security in-
terest in personal property or fixtures, and to the sales of accounts,
contractual rights, or chattel paper.'" When a debtor is "in default"
under a security agreement, the secured party has the right to exer-
cise remedies stated under part five of article nine.'7 Unless other-
wise agreed in the contractual dealing, the secured creditor has the
right to take possession of the collateral upon the debtor's default. 8
Clearly, the scheme is creditor-oriented and, undoubtedly, self-help
repossession is susceptible to abuse in practice." Still, self-help re-
Uniform Commercial Code-A Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK.
L. REV. 351 (1978). Professors White and Summers point out that the inclusion of the
phrase "breach of the peace" in section 9-503 was not by accident. J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, HANDBOOK Ok THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-6, at 1095
(1980). As a term of art, breach of the peace, and its meaning "has been the subject of
countless judicial opinions." Id. For present purposes, a brief summarization of the cur-
rent understanding of the phrase is sufficient. To determine whether a breach of the
peace has occurred, courts focus their examination on (1) whether the creditor entered
the debtor's premises, and (2) whether the debtor, or another speaking for the debtor,
consented to the entry and permitted the repossession. Id Normally, the creditor must
obtain permission to enter the debtor's home or garage "but he probably can take a
car from the debtor's driveway without incurring liability." Id. In any event, consent
given by the debtor validates an entry. However, if the debtor physically objects, self-
help repossession is precluded even though the security may be located in a public
place. Additionally, the "crude two-factor formula of creditor entry and debtor
response must ... be refined by . . . a consideration of third party response, the type
of premises entered and possible creditor deceit in procuring consent." Id.
16. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1978 version).
17. U.C.C. § 9-501 (1978 version).
8. Clontz, Guide to a Secured Creditor's Remedies on Debtors' Default, 7 U.C.C.
L.J. 348, 359 (1975).
19. G. GILMORE, supra note 12; Comment, supra note 15, at 351. For instance, due
to the existence of an acceleration clause, almost universally in modern security
agreements, the creditor has the power to cause all payments to become immediately
due and payable. U.C.C. § 1-208 authorizes acceleration stipulations, even the type
known as "insecurity clauses." U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978 version):
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate pay-
ment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised.
(Emphasis added). Section 1-208 commands that the creditor act in good faith. While
there is an ongoing dispute whether "honesty in fact," U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978 version),
is a subjective or objective test, see, e.g., Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408
F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969); Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky.
19811
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possession is a significant component to modern commercial financ-
ing," ultimately benefiting both borrower and creditor alike." The
secured creditor enjoys the capacity to prevent the debtor from re-
moving the collateral' beyond the reach of judicial process without
first obtaining court approval.3 The borrowing public, in turn, is
1964); G. GiLMORE, aupra note 12, at § 43.4, at 1197; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, sUpra
note 15, at § 26-3, at 1088-89, one fundamental issue appears to be overlooked. If the
creditor improperly and in "bad faith" accelerates the obligation placing the debtor in
default, the judicial determination of bad faith is not likely to be made until after the
debtor has been dispossessed of his encumbered property. Admittedly, an action for
money damages against the creditor, under a wrongful seizure theory, is available.
However, unless the debtor is able to secure the issuance of a restraining order or an
injunction, the creditor will sell the property, U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978 version), and the
debtor will forever lose the collateral. On this ground alone, self-help repossession and
sale constitutes undesirable policy.
20. Professor Spak reports that "[Tihe popular belief is that requiring notice and a
hearing before repossession would be too costly, and as a result, finance companies and
banks would cease loaning to credit risks." Spak, The Constitutionality of Reposses-
sion By Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10
Hous. L. REV. 855, 866 (1973).
21. Comment, supra note 15, at 352 n.7.
22. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) (1978 version) defines collateral as "the property subject to
a security interest."
23. In Louisiana, a writ of sequestration is required. LA. CODE Cxv. P. arts. 3501 &
8571. The writ of sequestration is a provisional or conservatory measure, accessory to
the principal action. See Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., Inc. v. Potter, 179 La. 197,
153 So. 690 (1934); Williams v. Duer, 14 La. 531 (1840); Johnson, Attachment and Se-
questration: Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 38
TUL. L. REV 1 (1963). See text at notes 162-88, infra. By contrast, U.C.C. § 9-503 sup-
plies the creditor with a mode of obtaining an expeditious return of the security
without "the necessity of expending court costs to regain possession." Comment, supra
note 15, at 352 n.7.
It is precisely this lack of judicial supervision over the creditor's exercise of the
repossession power that suggests the procedure is tinconstitutional in light of Supreme
Court opinions extending due process protection to debtors in prejudgment seizure in-
stances. See North Ga. Finishing. Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also
McDonald, Self-Help Repossession: Fuentes and Judicial Process, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 540
(1978). The debtors' rights revolution was so swift and monumental that Professors
Clark and Landers have written:
Nineteen sixty-nine was a momentous year. In that year the United States put a
man on the moon, and in that year the creditot met the Constitution. Since then,
the United States Supreme Court and a host of lower courts have, with increased
frequency, measured the law of creditor's rights against the requirements of due
process set forth in the fourteenth amendment.
Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond- The Creditor Meets the Constitu-
tion, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 355 (1978). However, since the due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment apply only to states, the salient issue is whether a
creditor's self-help repossession is conduct that may be termed "state action." If so,
the fourteenth amendment limitations apply. If not, only the private law of the states
controls the creditor's conduct.
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benefited since the creditor's self-help repossession more readily
facilitates the availability of less expensive credit.'
Accepting the contention that U.C.C. section 9-503 encourages
socially desirable results,8 one of which is low-cost consumer credit,
the creditor still may not utilize its provisions if to do so runs afoul
of the Constitution. In light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements
in the prejudgment seizure and garnishment area,2 the fourteenth
24. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditor's
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Johnson,
Denial of Self-Help Repossession.. An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82, 90-105
(1973); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 767, 772 (1973); White,
The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even Moore, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 503. Anthony Thompson reports that at the time the Burke and Reber article was
published they were with a Los Angeles law firm. Sheppard. Mullin, Richter & Hamp-
ton, which "had filed briefs on behalf of creditors in many cases challenging creditor's
remedies .... " Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory
and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession. 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1, 51 n.263.
Hence, their position is not surprising.
However, not all commentators agree that the intervention of the courts between
the foreclosing creditor and the defaulting debtor results in the general rise of credit
prices. See Krahmer. Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the Con-
sumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 Tex. TECH. L. REV. 23 (1972).
25. Not all agree that the lowered price of credit for the borrowing public justifies
the social costs imposed by self-help. Professor Crandall has argued that self-help
repossession "encourages a kind of sleazy practice that serves to lessen public respect
in our system of law and to create a real possibility for violence-two real societal
costs." Crandall, Proposal for Consumer Credit Reform: A Definition of Default A
Right to Cure, and a Right to Notice and an Opportunity For a Hearing Before
Repossession, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 1. 31-32 (1977).
26. North Ga. Finishing. Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974): Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Commentary on these decisions is abundant.
See, e.g., Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Loui-
siana Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV. 62 (1972); Burke & Reber, supra note 24;
Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes
to Mitchell North Georgia and Beyond. 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975); Clark, The
Foreclosing Creditor Under Article 9: Perilous Pitfalls Aplenty, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 291
(1976); Clark & Landers, supra note 23; Clontz, supra note 18; Crandall, supra note 25;
Del Duca, Editor's Headnotes: Prenotice, Prehearing, Prejudgment Seizure of Assets
Revisited, 7 U.C.C. L.J. 341 (1975); Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach. Flower or
Weed?, 79 CASE & COM. 3 (1974); Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages after
Sniadach. 75 COM. LJ. 5 (1970); Huffmire, Repossession Without Judicial Process:
What Lies Ahead?, 15 AM. Bus. L.J. 319 (1978); Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the
Prejudgment Seizure Cases. 64 KY. L.J. 705 (1976); L'Enfant, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Civil Procedure, 85 LA. L. REv. 442
(1976); McDonald, supra note 23; Mentschikoff. supra note 24; Nickles, Creditor sProvi.
sional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Attachment and Garnishment in
Arkansas, 81 ARK. L. REv. 607 (1978): Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional
Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975);
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amendment's bedrock standard of fundamental fairness" requires
that the prejudgment seizure writ issue only on judicial order with a
probable cause hearing slated shortly thereafter.u In contrast, the
U.C.C. permits the creditor to (1) declare when the debtor is in
default," (2) repossess the property of the debtor subject to the lien
or privilege,w and (3) sell the property at a public or private
sale 5 -all without any order or writ issuance from a court.
At first glance, section 9-503 appears to be a delegation to the
creditor of the state's power to seize an individual's property.' The
repossessing creditor acts in a manner traditionally associated with
the state, and acts under color of state law.- Consequently, the due
process prohibitions regarding prejudgment seizures" should be ap-
plicable, with the effectiveness of section 9-503 thoroughly negated.
Albeit logical, this aproach has not been enunciated by the vast ma-
jority of courts that have addressed the issue.3 Instead, the prevail-
Spak, supra note 20; Te Selle & Love, Attachment, Garnishment, Replevin and Self-
Help Repossession in Oklahoma, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 253 (1977); Thompson, supra note
24; White, supra note 24; Comment, UCC § 9.503-Repossession-State Action-Does
Repossession by a Secured Creditor Pursuant to Statutory and Contractual Provisions
Constitute State Action?, 50 DEN. L.J. 261 (1974); Comment. Specifying the Procedures
Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1510 (1975); Note, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies and Due Process of
Law- Connecticut's Summary Procedure Summarily Upheld Fermont Division,
Dynamics Corp. of America v. Smith, 12 CONN. L. REV. 174 (1979); Note, Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant Co.: Procedural Due Process Reexamined, 35 LA. L. REv. 221 (1974).
27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506 (9th ed. 1975).
28. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
29. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978 version). See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
30. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978 version).
31. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978 version).
32. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub. nom. Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Sections 9-503, 9-504-Due Pro-
cess-Adams v. Egley, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1503 (1972); Note, Constitutional
Law: State Action" UCC Self-Help Repossession Provisions (§§ 9.503, 9-504) Violate
Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1973); Note, Adams v. Southern
California First National Bank- 9-503 Constitutional-The End of a Notable Begin.
ning, 35 U. PIr. L. REV. 882 (1974). See also Thompson, supra note 24, at 4849.
33. When a private individual acts under color of state law his behavior is subject
to sanctions by federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(8) (1976). See
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
34. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
35. See, e.g., Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974): Gary
v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir.
1974); Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert denied. 419 U.S. 1039 (1974);
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ing view is that the creditor's self-help repossession does not de-
mand fourteenth amendment due process scrutiny; the state action
requisite is absent." By examining the state action"' doctrine one
can understand the reasons section 9-503 has, by and large, with-
Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1034
(1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1006 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied. 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Bichel
Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973). See
also Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975).
36. One contention for ruling section 9-503 unconstitutional is that state action can
be found in the legislature's approval, through enactment of the statute, of self-help
repossession. Huffmire, supra note 26, at 330. Such legislative approval of the self-help
remedy effectively delegates the state's traditional "authority to repossess to private
individuals." Id Nevertheless, the recitation by the federal court for the Western
District of Virginia, in Green v. First Nat'l Ezch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672. 675 (W.D.
Va. 1972), is typical:
The Fourteenth Amendment can control only the actions of states, not private in-
dividuals. Therefore, because the operation of the statute involved does 'not re-
quire the aid, assistance, or interaction of any state agent, body, organization or
function, the state has not deprived the plaintiff of his property.
Similarly, one writer has posited that "the single bar to successful attacks on the con-
stitutionality of section 9-503 would seem to be the lack of the requisite 'state action."'
Del Duca, supra note 26, at 345.
Another argument raised to avoid a finding of state action "is that since the
secured creditor's right to recover goods upon default arises from the security agree-
ment, it cannot be said that the state has acted in a private contract between in-
dividuals." Spak, supra note 20, at 865. For "if the contract recites the right to
repossession upon default without a breach of peace, the state has not acted in the
matter at all." Id
37. See Flagg Bros. Inc, v. Brooks, 486 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.. 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972): Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 887 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 878 U.S. 226 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth. 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 863 U.S. 230 (1957);
Terry v. Adams, 845 U.S. 461 (193); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Town-
send, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 278
U.S. 536 (1927); Black, Forewor& "State Action," Equal Protection and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967); Henkln, Shelley t Kraemer. Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962; Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (195Th
Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkev. A Teleoplhse of Subetntive Equal Protection,
1967 S. CT. REV. 39; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rev. 1088
(1960); Silard, A Constutional Forecast. Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Thompson, upra note 24;
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. Rev. 847 (19611, Van Alatyne &
Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961). See also G. GUNToUz, supre note 27, at
906.
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stood constitutional examination in the common law states, but at
the same time why its future in Louisiana is doubtful.
Rejecting the Revisionists-A Realistic State Action Lesson
Phrased in language proscribing a state from depriving an in-
dividual of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution' does
not restrain private conduct that would be prohibited if engaged in
by state actors." Absent a means of defining private behavior to be
that of the state, the fourteenth amendment affords no protection."
However, the distinction between state conduct and private ac-
tion is not always clear. In many instances a private individual prop-
erly may be characterized as a state actor. Many actions that seem
at first impression to be wholly private actually are interwoven with
governmental policy. In addition, due to traditional notions regard-
ing certain roles in which the state has exclusively acted, a private
actor filling such a role may be treated as a state for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment. Out of the need to classify that which
should be subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment, the
state action doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court."
The result of an application of the state action doctrine is to say
that ostensibly private conduct is that of a state, with the attendant
constitutional sanctions.
Professor Gunther has pointed out that the primary inquiry in
state action analysis is whether the private actor is either "suffi-
38. The pertinent constitutional statement reads: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972).
40. It appears that Congress may, however, in the exercise of the power granted
by section five of the fourteenth amendment, legislate beyond the self-effectuating pro-
visions of the amendment's text. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
41. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974): Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts,
353 U.S. 230 (1957); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935): Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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ciently entangled with or sufficiently like the state"" to consider his
conduct the act of the state. Simply stated, the state action doctrine
is reducible to (1) the "nexus" approach, which seeks to find suffi-
cient points of contact between the_ private actor and the state to
justify the placing of constitutional restraints on the private actor
or demanding state disengagement," and (2) the "public function"
analysis, which examines whether private action is appropriately
"state-like" to impose the constitutional restrictions." Furthermore,
once the state action barrier has been cleared, a constitutional right
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment must be at issue.'" The
circumstances of the foreclosing creditor provides an illustration of
both the constitutional right involved and the state action concept.
Until a fews years ago'" replevin was the usual creditor's remedy:
the U.C.C. stated that when the collateral could not be privately
repossessed without breaching the peace, the creditor might pro-
ceed by action.'" The action was instituted through filing a replevin
suit, giving a replevin bond, and entering an affidavit of right to
possession of the security." In short, replevin normally did not re-
quire a judicial hearing prior to the issuance of the clerk's writ and
seizure by the sheriff."
42. G. GUNTHER, supra note 27, at 916.
48. Id at 915. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton,
882 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelly v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
44. G. GUNTHER. supra note 27, at 915. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944): Nixon v. Condon. 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon. 273 U.S. 536 (1927). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
45. Generally the claim will be presented by way of an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that money damages and injunctive relief
are proper remedies against any person depriving others of constitutional rights under
color of state law. The claimant must show, in the words of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, a
deprivation "of a right 'secured by the Constitution and the law' of the United States."
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). Furthermore, there must be a demonstration that the
state actor "deprived... this right acting 'under color of any statute' of the State ...."
Ii. "It is clear that these two elements denote two separate areas of inquiry." I&
(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
46. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
47. U.C.C. § 9-508 (1978 version).
48. Clark, supra note 28, at 369.
49. Id
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However, opinions from the Supreme Court first indicated' and
then confirmed"' that replevin was unconstitutional in that it deprived
the debtor of his property without a judicial hearing or order. Sub-
sequently, the Court appeared to take a step back from its extension
of procedural due process rights to a debtor." But in view of a more
recent pronouncement," the constitutional limits on prejudgment
seizures may be summarized by stating that when a creditor causes
a judicial writ to issue for the seizure of a debtor's property, the
debtor must be given an opportunity to be heard." The fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of procedural due process is triggered by
the fact that a court,' an arm of the state, issues the seizure writ
which is executed by a sheriff, a state officer. Certainly the state is
enmeshed in the creditor's remedial procedure, replevin, and the
state. action doctrine is applicable.
In the context of section 9-503, forceful arguments can be mar-
shalled that a secured creditor employing the self-help remedy may
be categorized under both prongsu of the state action doctrine. On
the one hand, the seizing creditor is utilizing his statutory right to
repossess. The "nexus" test seems satisfied since the creditor is
50. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Since Sniadach's holding
was limited to prejudgment garnishment of a debtor's wages, one contemporary com-
mentator suggested that the debtor's procedural due process rights extended no fur-
ther. Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages after Sniadach, 75 COM. L.J. 5
(1970). Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). ultimately proved this view to be incor-
rect.
51. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See Anderson & L'Enfant, supra note 26;
Comment, Fuentes v. Shevi.: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts and Effect Upon
Louisiana Law, 47 TUL. L. Rav. 806 (1973).
52. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In Mitchell, the Supreme Court
upheld Louisiana's sequestration procedures, LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3501 & 3571, a
remedy akin to common law replevin. The determining distinction seemed to be Loui-
siana's requirement of a judicial order before the sheriff would be issued the writ of
fieri facias. Yet some writers, including Professor L'Enfant, questioned whether Mit-
chell sub silentio overruled Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). L'Enfant, supra note
26, at 453-54. Precisely, Professor L'Enfant argued: "Although the Court chose to speak
of Fuentes and Mitchell as distinguishable cases, it seems more accurate to say that
Mitchell marks a considerable departure from Fuentes." Id. at 454-55.
53. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
54. Mr. Justice White, writing the W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell opinion, reasoned
"that a hearing must be had before one is finally deprived of his property ...." 416
U.S. at 611. The rule "has been '[wlhere only property rights are involved, mere
postponement of the judicial [ijnquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate."' Id. (quoting Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931)).
55. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
56. See text at notes 42-44, supra.
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operating with the approval of the state legislature."1 On the other
hand, the creditor, in seizing the security for sale," is carrying out a
task that traditionally has remained within the province of state
agents,"9 chiefly the sheriff. Therefore, the "public function" element
of state action examination appears satisfied."
The argument that the repossessing creditor is a state actor for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment was accepted in the federal
court for the Southern District of California.1 Only a few months
prior to the Supreme Court's Fuentes v. Shevin" opinion, Adams v.
Egley' held that a creditor repossessing under section 9-503 repre-
sented conduct of the sort traditionally performed by the state."
The district court relied on the encouragement theory of state ac-
tion as articulated in Reitman v. Mulkey." The U.C.C. sections at
issue" were read as setting forth a "state policy," and security
agreements which incorporated the statutory rules were "embodi-
ment[s] of that policy."'" Statutorily endorsed self-help was cited as
unconstitutional primarily because the U.C.C. did not limit self-help
repossession to "secured transactions between parties of equal bar-
gaining power."" On appeal, however, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
perceived the problem quite differently." Judge Trask, as the
57. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
58. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978 version).
59. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
60. But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
61. Adams v. Egley. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nor. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974).
62. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
63. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See Note. Uniform Commercial Code-Sec-
tions 9-503, 9-504-Due Process-Adams v. Egley, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1503
(1972); Note, Constitutional Law: State Action: U.C.C. Self-Help Repossession Provi-
sions (§ 9-503, 9-504) Violate Due-Process Requirements, 57 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1973);
Note, Adams v. Southern California First National Bank- § 9.503 Constitutional- The
End of a Notable Beginning, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 882 (1974).
64. 338 F. Supp. at 617.
65. 1d.
66. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504 (1978 version).
67. 338 F. Supp. at 618.
68. Id at 621.
69. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'g
Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See Note, Adams v. Southern
California First National Bank- § 9-503 Constitutional-The End of a Notable Begin-
ning, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 882 (1974).
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court's writer, noted that even prior to the enactment of the U.C.C.
the creditor's self-help procedure had been "recognized and permit-
ted as a part of the common law.""0 Still, the court correctly realized
that the sole fact of common-law statutory confirmation was not the
determining factor in state action analysis. 1 Instead, the pertinent
guide was said to be state involvement-plus-"significant state in-
volvement.""2 The court distinguished Reitman8 by opining that the
significant state involvement test meant something similar to the
70. 492 F.2d at 330. Undoubtedly, the argument that U.C.C. sections 9-503 and
9-504 do not create any new rights in the secured creditor, but merely restate the
common law position, is the strongest one for the absence of state action. And "(miost
courts consider Section 9-503 to be merely a codification of the common law right to
repossess ...." Huffmire, supra note 26, at 330. "It is argued that repossession by the
secured creditor is a private matter and unlike replevin does not require the
assistance of the state or its agents and involves neither the court nor the sheriff." Id.
On a different ground the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California failed to find state action in a factual circumstance similar to Adams. Oiler
v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The Otler court distinguished
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), as a racial discrimination matter which demanded
the strictest examination under the fourteenth amendment. 342 F. Supp. at 23. Known
somewhat loosely as a revisionist theory of state action, see Thompson, supra note 24,
at 22, the analysis employed in Oiler is ultimately fruitless and circular. While it is
true that any form of racial discrimination is subjected to the inevitably fatal strict
scrutiny, see, e.g., Regents of the University of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
state action is a requisite for application of the fourteenth amendment. Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). A more
satisfactory approach is to determine the state action question separately from the
question of the strength of the federal claim.
71. W4isely, the Adams panel did not rest its decision solely on the grounds that
the U.C.C. does not grant a secured creditor rights not existing at common law. A
powerful argument can be framed that the fact of the California state legislature's
adoption of sections 9-503 and 9-504, alone, should constitute state action. See note 58,
supra, and accompanying text. Secured creditors could, hypothetically, be unaware of
their common law rights and might be encouraged through the statutory permission to
engage in self-help when they otherwise might not. Furthermore the principal
postulate for striking section 9-503 is that "state action can be found in enactment of
the statute by the legislature which lends its approval to self-help repossession and
delegates its traditional ... authority to repossess to private individuals." Huffmire,
supra note 26, at 330.
72. 492 F.2d at 330 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)). See
also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961). The panel read the Supreme Court's Evans v. Abney, 896 U.S. 435
(1970), ruling as a rejection of a broad state action formula, "even in the racial area."
492 F.2d at 381 n.15. The rationale was practical: "Statutes and laws regulate many
forms of purely private activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting
all behavior that conforms to state law to the Fourteenth Amendment would
emasculate the state action concept." Id. at 331.
78. 492 F.2d at 332.
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"symbiotic relationship"' present between the state-lessor and the
private discriminator"6 lessee in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority." The Ninth Circuit discerned at least two differentiating
features." Initially, "the State in Reitman was involved to a far
greater degree in the challenged conduct . .. ."71 With regard to the
self-help issue, the adoption of the U.C.C. "did not reverse the law
as it had been prior to the enactment of the Code, but merely codi-
fied existing law for the most part.""
Secondly, "and consistent with the reasoning of several other
courts,"" the Adams panel doubted that resolution of the state ac-
tion quagmire in a prejudgment self-help repossession instance was
controlled properly by a racial discrimination decision. 1 "IT]hese
creditor remedies were based on economically reasoned grounds of
very long standing, which appear to have been the topic of extensive
research and legislative investigation."" The court dismissed the
debtor's allegation that by "putting into statutory form existing
private remedies, the State conclusively and significantly involves
itself in the private conduct."" The debtors had failed to state a
federal cause of action."
Despite criticism of the decision as a product of tortured reason-
74. Id. at 331. See Burton v: Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
75. As Professor Gunther notes, "[tlhe term 'discriminator' is used ...as short-
hand for the private actor engaging in allegedly unconstitutional behavior. Bear in
mind, however, that discrimination is not the only focus of the 14th Amendment." G.
GUNTHER, su.pra note 27, at 916.
76. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
77. 492 F.2d at 332.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 833 (citing Colvin v. Arco Fin. Serv., Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. 25 (D. Utah
1978); Kirsey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Natl Bank,
351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672
(W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick
v. First Nat'l Bank, 822 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Brown v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 509 P.2d 442 (Or. 1973); Mesenger v. Sandy Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d
402 (1972)).
81. 492 F.2d at 33. The court succinctly stated that "[ulnlike Reitman, there has
been no finding that it was the intent of the State in passing § 9-503 to authorize any
conduct that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
82. Id
83. Id
84. "We reverse in Adams and affirm in Hampton, noting that the proper ground
for dismissing in Hampton was failure to state a federal cause of action, rather than
that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 38 (citing Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
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ing," the Adams court's analysis of the creditor's self-help remedies
available before the enactment of the U.C.C. seems correct. If the
U.C.C. only restated in sections 9-503 and 9-504 the common practice
in California, then another reference to Reitman is appropriate. In
an attempt to limit the boundaries of its ruling, the Reitman majority
carefully noted that the fourteenth amendment did not bar a state
from putting into "statutory form an existing policy of neutrality
with respect to private discriminations.""u Hence in cases challeng-
ing sections 9-503 and 9-504, an examination of the history of
creditors' remedies in the jurisdiction, including self-help reposses-
sion, before the advent of the U.C.C. is necessary.
Adams' second means of distinguishing Reitman, however, that
a racial discrimination case should not govern the result in the
litigation of the constitutionality of a secured creditor's self-help
remedy, is really a confusion of the merits with what should be a
preliminary inquiry -the state action examination. An initial finding
of state action does not mean that the strict scrutiny analysis of
race discrimination cases is invoked on the merits. Rather, the deb-
tor's only fourteenth amendment guarantee, assuming state action
to be present, is the procedural right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard when his property is taken."7 Remarkably, the Adams
court recognized the flaw in its reasoning when Judge Trask wrote
that "it may be argued that state action is a 'jurisdictional' question
to be considered separate from substantive matters ... ,."I Yet, the
court persisted in making the distinction. Since the state action
determination is involved in finding private conduct to be under color
of state laws for jurisdictional purposes," the better view appears
to be to separate completely the state action inquiry from the
procedural or substantive constitutional protections.
Be that as it may, Adams' influence was widespread and swiftly
felt;'" it became the precedent for seven other circuits.'" In view of
85. Thompson, supra note 24, at 50.
86. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 301-20 (1977); Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975).
88. 492 F.2d at 333 n.23.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
91. Anthony Thompson wrote that "[wjithin 15 months of the original opinion the
Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits had relied on Adams." Thompson, supra note 24, at 52-53.
92. Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titleman. 502 F.2d 1107 (8d Cir.
[Vol. 42
COMMENTS
the contemporary inclination to extend procedural due process pro-
tections to debtors in debtor-creditor disputes, the Supreme Court's
persistent refusal to grant certiorari in section 9-503 cases is some-
what surprising." Three years ago, however, the Court took what
appears to be the inevitable step in upholding the constitutionality
of the U.C.C. authorized self-help measures."
In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks" the high Court declined to ac-
cept the claim that a sale of stored property under U.C.C. section
7-210, to enforce a warehouseman's lien, was subject to procedural
due process strictures." The federal district court had concluded
that the warehouseman's conduct was not attributable to the state.'7
Reversing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that state in-
volvement with the proposed sale existed."' The divided circuit
panel reasoned that in "enacting [section) 7-210 New York . . . dele-
gated to the warehouseman a portion of its sovereign monopoly
power over binding conflict resolution .... [and] also let him, by sel-
ling stored goods, execute a lien and thus perform a function which
has traditionally been that of the sheriff.""
The issue was presented squarely to the Court; Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, predictably authoring the majority opinion,"' noted that
1974); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v.
State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Bichel Op-
tical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
93. Gibbs v. Titleman, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,
419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974);
Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974).
94. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
95. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
96. Id at 166.
97. Finding that the warehouseman's conduct was not attributable to the state,
the district court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Judge Werker wrote:
"[t]he court must conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show sufficient state involve-
ment in the enforcement of warehousemen's liens to confer jurisdiction upon a federal
district court .... " Id. at 1068-67.
98. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc. 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977).
99. Id at 771.
100. Although the question was not framed in the creditor's self-help context, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist had tipped his hand that the state action doctrine should be cir-
cumscribed in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The Jackson
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Metropolitan Edison's authority to cut off
her electric power, pursuant to a tariff filed with the State Public Utilities Commis-
sion, without meeting procedural due process requirements. In essence, the petitioner
invited the expansion of the state action principle into a broad notion "that all
businesses 'affected with the public interest' are state actions in all their actions." Id.
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certiorari was granted to address the "important question ... con-
cerning the meaning of 'state action' as that term is associated with
the Fourteenth Amendment."'' The burden was not an easy one for
the debtors; they had to establish not only that Flagg Brothers
acted under color of the challenged statutes, but also that its be-
havior could otherwise be linked to the state. 2
The Court commented that while a private person may cause a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, "he may be subject
to liability under [section] 1983103 only when he does so under color of
law."' 1 Rejecting the contention that New York delegated to Flagg
Brothers power traditionally exercised by the state,' 5 the majority
recited a different view as to the meaning of the public function arm
of the state action doctrine. "While many functions have been tradi-
tionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively
reserved to the State."""' The exclusive state function approach is
at 353. Mr. Justice Rehnquist retorted, "[wle decline the invitation for reasons stated
long ago in Nebbia v. New York ...." Id. (citation omitted).
While Flagg Brothers did not question the constitutionality of section 9-503, in light
of the Jackson opinion, the words of one author seem particularly prophetic: "And if
the High Court ever gets the case [whether sections 9-503 and 9-504 are constitutional),
the opinion upholding self-help repo [sic) will surely be written by Mr. Justice Rehn-
quisti" Clark, supra note 26, at 311 (emphasis added). Nor was Professor Spak far from
the mark: "If and when repossession under UCC 9-503 is heard by the Supreme Court,
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who did not sit for Fuentes, may very well join the
Fuentes dissent in holding repossesion to be constitutional." Spak, supra note 20, at
867 n.84.
101. 436 U.S. at 155.
102. The Court outlined the two essential elements for a section 1983 claim. First,
a demonstration that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States
has been deprived is required. Id. In addition, the debtors had to "show that Flagg
Brothers deprived them of this right acting 'under color of any statute' of the State of
New York." Id (citation omitted). The "two elements denote two separate areas of in-
quiry." Id. at 155-56 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
104. 436 U.S. at 156.
105. Id. at 157. The Court recognized that "[wihile as a factual matter any person
with sufficient physical power may deprive a person of his property," id., only a
"private person whose action 'may be fairly treated as that of the state itselr ... may
deprive him of 'an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion .... "' Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972)). In the Flagg Brothers case the warehouse-
man's conduct could not ".4 fairly construed as that of the state of New York. 436 U.S.
at 157.
106. 436 U.S. at 158. Speaking of both the "nexus" test and the "public function"
standard for state action analysis, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated that the "two branches
of the public function doctrine have in common the feature of exclusivity." Id at 159
(emphasis added).
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dramatic in its potential impact.'" Since the proposed sale by Flagg
Brothers, pursuant to section 7-210, was not the sole manner of re-
solving the "purely private dispute,"' New York could "hardly be
said to have delegated an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign." 10'
A very plausible reading of the Flagg Brothers opinion is as the
Supreme Court's statement that all forms of debtor-creditor self-
help disputes are beyond the fourteenth amendment's reach for
want of state action. 110 The Court's analysis "requires no parsing of
the difference between various commercial liens and other remedies
to support the conclusion that ... [the] entire field of activity is out-
side the scope of Terry and Marsh."' With practical policy con-
siderations seemingly playing a significant role in the result, the
Court concluded that the "sovereign-function cases do not support a
107. From the majority's citations it may be Inferred that future state actions ap-
plications, with regard to public functions, will be severely limited. After all, very few
functions have been historically reserved to the state. The authority to conduct elec-
tions is one area. See, eg., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1963); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 78 11932). Additionally, the "municipal-
function" theory of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), still appears viable. Beyond
these rather limited illustrations of public functions, the potential for any expansion ap-
pears bleak. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
108. 4386 U.S. at 160.
109. Id The Court was terse in its conclusion: "Whatever the particular remedies
available under New York law, we do not consider a more detailed description of them
necessary to our conclusion that the settlement of disputes between debtors and
creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function." Id at 161.
110. Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1979.1980-Security Devices, 41 LA. L.
REv. 389, 397 (1981). Particularly, the Court wrote: "Self-help of the type involved in
this case is not significantly different from creditor remedies generally, whether
created by common law or enacted by legislatures .... The proposed sale ... in this
case is not a significant departure from traditional private arrangements." 436 U.S. at
162 n.12. In addition, "[tjhe fact that such a judicial review of a self-help remedy is
seldom encountered bears witness to the important part that such remedies have
played in our system of property rights." Id at 161 n.11. One might question whether
importance is a proper consideration in state action analysis. Undeniably, the judiciary
engages in a weighing or balancing of competing interests when deciding the merits of
a case. But since the state action determination is primarily jurisdictional, see note 70,
supra, the remarks regarding the policy of self-help seem unwise. Perhaps the Court is
presently of the view that North Ga. Finishing, Inc v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1974), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Sniadach v. Family Finance Co., 395
U.S. 337 (1969), were decided incorrectly. Unwilling to overrule North Georgia.
Fuentes, and Sniadach, the Flagg Brothers Court achieves the same result in refusing
to find state action. Yet, it must be remembered that Flagg Brothers may be
distinguished from the prejudgment seizure cases; "[in Fla~g Brothers the warehouse-
man was already in possession of the merchandise and the goods secured a legal not a
consensual lien . ... " Rubin, supra, at 397 n.52.
111. 436 U.S. at 162.
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finding of state action here.""11 Furthermore, Flagg Brothers stands
for the proposition that in enacting section 7-210 New York did not
encourage the self-help sale nor did it become intertwined with the
creditor's conduct. Section 7-210 was viewed as state acquiescence in
private behavior; "the State of New York has not compelled the sale
of a bailor's goods, but has merely announced the circumstances
under which its courts will not interfere with a private sale. '"', Con-
sequently, the statutory refusal to intervene in the debtor-creditor
dispute was said to be no different from a prescriptive statute
"whereby the State declines to provide a remedy for private depri-
vations of property after the passage of a given period of time.""'
Analytically, Flagg Brothers is correct in discerning a distinc-
tion between the settlement of disputes between creditors and deb-
tors and the problems of conducting elections1 or running company
towns. "' However, the strongest part of the Court's examination is
also, in some respects, its weakest. At one and the same time the
Court stated that looking to historical examples is proper in decid-
ing whether repossession and sale were matters left exclusively in
the hands of the state,"' while also stating that the "historical ante-
cedents" ' 8 of a particular practice will not control the decision. 1' To
do so "would result in the constitutional condemnation in one State
of a remedy found perfectly permissible in another." ' Such a state-
ment fails to evaluate the importance of reviewing the history of
resolving private commercial disputes in the different jurisdictions.
The ordering of rights between debtors and creditors, insofar as the
granting of privileges and respective rankings is concerned, is a
matter for state ruling, not federal law. If the traditional view in a
state prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. was that a creditor could
not exercise self-help measures, then suggesting that the adoption of
the U.C.C. did not delegate state power to private individuals is fan-
ciful.
112. Id at 163.
113. Id at 166.
114. rd
115. See, e.g.. Terry v. Adams, 845 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
116. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
117. See text at notes 105-10, aupra.
118. 436 U.S. at 162.
119. Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that "even if we were inclined to extend the
sovereign-function doctrine outside of its present carefully confined bounds, the field of
private commercial transactions would be a particularly inappropriate area into which
to expand it." Id at 163.
120. 436 U.S. at 16243.
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Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent"2 ' was incisive and direct. He
perceived the state action test adopted by the Court as requiring de-
cisions as to what functions have been "traditionally exclusively re-
served to the State."'22 Necessarily, the practice in the jurisdiction
from which the case arose required examination; "[s]uch an issue
plainly cannot be resolved in a historical vacuum."'2" Mr. Justice
Marshall's thesis appears completely sound. If the Court intended
sub silentio to send out a message that it "will reject future consti-
tutional challenges to prejudgment private seizures and sales,"''
then the opinion should have stated so. Certainly the Flagg Brothers
situation was distinguishable from earlier problems raised in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., Fuentes v. Shevin," and
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'," In each of those instances a
state official was active in the deprivation of the debtor's property;
the state action was obvious. Merely because the state's role in a
section 7-210 problem or section 9-503 instance is indirect does not
relieve the judiciary of its responsibility as overseers of the creditor
collection process. The bench should inquire into the claim of a deb-
tor that a creditor, acting with authority traditionally exercised by
the state, has repossessed and sold his encumbered property absent
the incidents attached to fundamentally fair conduct. The fourteenth
amendment prohibits states'" or private persons acting in the capa-
city of the state'" from taking an individual's property without due
process. In the formula of fourteenth amendment state action analy-
sis, state action is not assumed to be constant or identical in every
121. 436 U.S. at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. l& at 167 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)
(emphasis in original)). In short, Mr. Justice Marshall announced that he was "troubled
by the Court's cavalier treatment of the place of historical factors in the 'state action'
inquiry." 436 U.S. at 167 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
123. 436 U.S. at 167 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall's critique is in-
structive:
By ignoring .. .history, the Court approaches the question before us as if it can
be decided without reference to the role that the State has always played in lien
execution by forced sale. In so doing, the Court treats the state as if it were, to
use the Court's words, "a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal
stratosphere." . . .The state action doctrine, as developed in past cases, requires
that we come down to earth and decide the issue here with careful attention to
the State's traditional role.
Ild.
124. Rubin, Security Devices. 1979.1980, supra note 110, at 397.
125. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
126. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
127. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
128. See note 38, supra.
129. See note 33, supra.
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state. What might have been sanctioned traditionally in one jurisdic-
tion might have been denied in another. The very reason for the
adoption of the U.C.C., uniformity, plainly reminds that the commer-
cial practices in the several states varied significantly. Even in juris-
dictions that draw on the common law as the institutional source,
significant historical variations on the self-help issue may exist.
Clearly, if a state looks to a system of law with different conventions
from the common law,/ an exacting study of the traditional func-
tions reserved to the state is demanded before it can be resolved
that the U.C.C. only restates the prevalent practice.
The Civilian Heritage
The fundamental tenet prohibiting the taking of the law into
one's own hands can be traced to Spanish1 ' and, ultimately, to
Roman' origins. Savigny may have best articulated the rationale
for the civil law's abhorrence of self-help."' Discussing the posses-
sory actions available to the person physically controlling a thing,
Savigny disagreed with the commentators who explain the posses-
sory remedies as derivatives of a presumption of ownership."' He
posited that the basis for the possessory actions was not a presump-
tion of ownership theory,' since possessory actions are accorded to
persons surely not the owner.' In fact, persons with possession may
130. Louisiana, for instance, looks to the continental civil law for reference as well
as drawing on Roman sources. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4. at §§ 25-26.
131. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, bk. VII, tit. X, L. X (S. Scott trans. 1931).
132. DIGEST, Book XLIII, Title XVI, 1(g).
133. V. SAVIGNY, TREATISE ON POSSESSION OR THE JUS POSSESSIONIS OF THE CIVIL
LAW 26-27 (6th ed. E. Perry trans. 1848). Savigny wrote that "[plossession appears...
as the mere dominion in fact over a subject ... as a matter wholly indifferent in law."
Id at 27 (emphasis added). The presumption of ownership concept has "no legal foun-
dation, for in naked possession, it is no more probable that the possessor has the prop-
erty than that he has it not." Id at 28.
134. Savigny points out that "possession has been regarded not as a special right,
but provisional ownership ... introduced merely for the purpose of regulating the
practice in suits respecting the right of property." Id. at 26. This view is described as
in "error" for "an owner is not to be confounded with a possessor . . . 'et ideo non
denegatur ei interdictum uti possidetis qui cepit rem vindicare. Non enim videtur
possessioni renuntiasse, qui rem vindicavit'" Id at 26-27.
135. Id.
136. "The ground of the fiction or presumption consists therefore ... solely in the
legal title, and as none such occurs in bare possession, the above ground is wanting to
it for a legal presumption as to property." Id. at 29. Irrespective of title, all possessors
are entitled to the position of a defendant in a suit upon property "which relieves him
of the burden of proof." Id. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3456.
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have legal protections from those entitled to possess " and even
against the true owner.'"
Thus, the civilian possessory actions, Savigny argued, operated
to the benefit of the person solely because he is in possession.'" Pos-
session is a fact, and the law aids the person physically detaining
the thing because of this fact, not by reason of a presumed right to
possess.4 0 For policy reasons, the law provides refuge for the per-
son, the factual possessor; the action is for the benefit of the person
and not the property. In denying self-help, admittedly, the factual
status quo is maintained. But, even more importantly, the individual
liberty of persons and the maintenance of public order are guaran-
teed."'
Louisiana's system reflects a view of civilianism similar to that
held by Savigny.1" For instance, Civil Code article 3454(1)1" states:
"Rights, which are common to all possessors in good or bad faith,
are that: 1. They are considered provisionally as owners of the thing
which they possess, so long as it is not reclaimed by the true owner
or person entitled to reclaim it, and, even after such reclamation,
until the right of the person making it is established ... ."'" The
positive law'" demands a judicial determination of rights before one
with the right to possess will be placed in possession. Support for
this approach exists in other civil law systems.'"
137. V. SAVIONY, *UPrO note 133, at 31-32.
138. l. at 32.
139. Savigny attributed the possessory remedies and protections "to the inviolability
of the person, and to the connection which exists between the person and the thing
arising from the natural subordination of the latter." It
140. See LA. Crv. CODE art. 3451(1).
141. Possessory rights protect the inviolability of the person; 'ithe person must, at
all times, be secured against violence ... ." V. SAVIGNY, supra note 183, at 27.
142. Prior to its repeal in 1979, 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, Civil Code article 496 pro-
vided, in part, that "Itihe ownership and the possession of a thing are entirely
distinct." See LA. Civ. CODE art. 3454.
148. Civil Code article 3454 is located in the articles treating possession. Possession
is recognized as resulting from a fact and "confers on the possessor certain rights with
regard to the thing possessed ... " LA. Civ. CODE art. 3450. Possession may either be
in good faith, LA. CiV. CODE art. 8451, or in bad faith. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3452. Primarily
the distinction is made for purposes of acquisitive prescription and not to lessen the
protections the law affords to possession. The rights which are common to all
possessors are guaranteed by article 3454.
144. .LA. Civ. CODE art. 8454 (emphasis added).
145. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1: "Law is a solemn expression of legislative will." See LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 18 & 17.
148. Cf LAS SiETE PAmTIDAS bk. V11, tit. X, L. XIV (S. Scott trans. 1981)
Men are at times so daring as to seize forcibly, by way of pledge or payment,
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In Louisiana, the long-standing rule is that a secured creditor
cannot seize encumbered property absent legal process." ' If the
creditor fails to utilize the judicial remedy and acts on his own,
liability arises for damages caused"' pursuant to a tort theory under
Civil Code article 2315."' Early decisions, such as Reed v. Shreveport
Furniture Co. "' and Elders v. Montgomery-Ward & Co.'"' concluded
that a chattel mortgagee cannot foreclose without legal process,
"and if he does he is liable for his tortious conduct ... ."I" The sec-
ond circuit affirmed the district court's awarding of damages in
Elders and noted that the debtor's "furniture was taken without any
legal process ... and was done without authority of law."'' For such
actions no excuse existed"' and the creditor was "responsible to
plaintiffs for the damages caused in bringing upon them the incon-
venience, embarassment, and humiliation they have shown.""
Similarly, Louisiana cases treating the enforcement of the
lessor's privilege have shunned consistently self-help.'" Lessors per-
property belonging to persons indebted to them, and although the latter may be
their debtors, we hold that they act in an outrageous manner; for judges are ap-
pointed in certain districts in order that men may obtain justice by their deci-
sions, and may not have the power to exact it themselves. Wherefore, we decree
that if any person violates this law by removing property from the house or con-
trol of his debtor, if he had any right to the property which he removed he shall
lose It for these reasons ....
The policy is clear: the right to possess is subservient to the fact of possession. The
person seeking to enforce his right to possess must resort to the courts. Article 20 of
the Civil Code of Austria expresses the principle in a similar manner. "A valid title
gives only the right to possess property, not possession itself. A person who has only
the right to possess may not, in case of refusal put himself into possession arbitrarily;
he must seek possession by order from the ordinary judge ... ."
147. See, e.g., Gradeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp.. 223 La. 504. 66
So. 2d 317 (1953;, Lavalis v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp., 110 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958); Elders v. Montgomery-Ward & Co.. 172 So. 191 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937);,
Reed v. Shreveport Furniture Co., 7 La. App. 184 (2d Cir. 1927); Daggett, T7e Chattel
Mortgage in Louisiana (Part I), 18 Tin.. L. Rv. 284, 248-49 (1939;, Comment, The
Louisiana Law of Lease, 89 TUL. L. REv. 798, 882 (1965).
148. See, e.g., Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 228 La. 504, 66
So. 2d 817 (1953); Elders v. Montgomery-Ward & Co., 172 So. 191 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987, Daggett, supra note 147, at 248-49.
149. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2315 provides: "[eivery act of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault It happened to repair It."
160. 7 La. App. 184 (2d Cir. 1927).
151. 172 So. 191 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987)
152. Daggett, supra note 147, at 249.
153. 172 So. at 194 (emphasis added).
154. Id at 195.
155. Id
156. See. e.g., Boniel v. Block, 44 La. Ann. 614, 10 So. 869 (1892);, Thayer v. Lttd-
john, 1 Rob. 140 (LA. 1841) Prkle & Williams v. Sbreveport Jitney Jungle. 19 La. App.
[Vol. 42
COMMENTS
sonally evicting lessees and seizing tenants' property have been ruled
reponsible in damages.' Several writers have termed the judicial
stance as "reasonable in light of the generous remedies available in
the courts."lu And the secured creditor is not without his remedies.
In lieu of self-help repossession, the secured creditor in Louisiana
may utilize the writ of sequestration 9 to insure the integrity of the
collateral until a judgment can be obtained and a sale authorized.,'
Louisiana's Sequestration Writ-A Post-Mitchell Appraisal and
Precursor to the Applicable Analysis
The writ of sequestration supplies one of the two prejudgment
security measures for Louisiana creditors.' As a provisional or con-
servatory measure, sequestration is accessory to the principle ac-
tion.'" Since sequestration is a harsh remedy, however, it is avail-
able only in the cases specifically authorized by law;' the writ
"run[s] counter to the fundamental concept that a person's property
should not be taken from him before he is given an opportunity for
proper adjudication of his rights."'' A writ properly issues when
the creditor pleads that it is within the power of the defendant to
conceal, remove from the court's jurisdiction, dispose of, or waste
the property in which the petitioner claims an interest."" Prior to
the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1960, the plaintiff,
applying for the issuance of the sequestration writ, had to swear
729, 140 So. 837 (2d Cir. 1932); Pelletier v. Sutter, 10 La. App. 662, 121 So. 364 (Orl.
Cir. 1929). "It is a well-established policy of the civil law to discourage the efforts of an
individual to enforce a right in a manner which avoids the use of the judicial process."
Comment, supra note 147, at 882.
157. See, e.g., Boniel v. Block, 44 La. Ann. 514. 10 So. 869 (1892); Thayer v. Little-
john, 1 Rob. 140 (La. 1841); Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, 19 La. App.
729, 140 So. 837 (2d Cir. 1932); Pelletier v. Sutter, 10 La. App. 662, 121 So. 364 (Orl.
Cir. 1929).
158. Comment, supra note 147, at 883.
159. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3501 & 3571.
160. It must be remembered that the writ of sequestration is a prejudgment pro-
cedural device. Until the creditor has prevailed on the merits of the action the security
may not be sold. To this rule there is one exception. Code of Civil Procedure article
3513 states that perishable property may be adjudicated and "Itihe proceeds of such a
sale shall be held by the sheriff subject to the orders of the court."
161. The writ of attachment is the other provisional remedy. See LA. CODE CIv. P.
arts. 3541-46.
162. See, e.g.. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. Potter, 179 La. 197, 153 So. 690
(1934); Williams v. Duer. 14 La. 531 (1840).
163. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3571.
164. Johnson, supra note 23, at 3.
165. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3571.
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that he had "good reason to fear" that the defendant would deprive
him of the property in question." Subsequently, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals made it clear that "the new Code of Civil Pro-
cedure requires only that it be within the power of the defendant to
conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues there-
from, or to remove the property from the parish."'' Unlike the
creditor's self-help procedure permitted by the U.C.C.,' a writ of
sequestration is issued only in conjunction with the filing of a veri-
fied petition stating the nature of the claim, the grounds on which
the writ is based, and the amount involved if the action is for a sum
of money.'" Furthermore, the plaintiff is required to furnish security
in the event that the defendant suffers damages as a result of a
wrongful sequestration. '" The defendant may move to dissolve the
writ and the court may award attorney's fees in addition to damages
whether the writ is dissolved at a motion hearing or after trial on
the merits.''
Not dissimilar to other jurisdiction's prejudgment seizure provi-
sions, the writ of sequestration has been subjected to constitutional
scrutiny."' However, the United States Supreme Court's determina-
tion was decidedly different: the writ as issued in Louisiana's pro-
cedural scheme was held not to offend due process. '78 In Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co." ' the creditor instituted suit for collection of the un-
paid balance on a sale of household appliances."' Alleging in the ex
parte sequestration application that the creditor held a vendor's lien
on the property and that it was within the defendant's power to dis-
166. LA. R.S. 18:4001 (1950) (repealed by 1960 La. Acts, No. 32); LA. CODE CIv. P.
art. 3671, comment (a). See generally H. DAGGETT, ON LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHAT-
TEL MORTGAGES § 51 (1942); Margolin, Civil Law, Vendor's Privilege, 4 TUL. L. REV.
239 (1930).
167. Montagne v. Tinker, 197 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
168. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504 (1972 version).
169. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3501.
170. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 3501. However, "(a] writ of sequestration to enforce a
lessor's privilege shall issue without the furnishing of security." LA. CODE Civ. P. art.
3575 (emphasis added).
171. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3506. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1, 46 n.202 (1960).
172. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
173. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1974).
174. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See Note. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: Procedural Due
Process Reexamined, 35 LA. L. REV. 221 (1974).
175. The petition "alleged the sale by Grant to Mitchell of a refrigerator, range,
stereo, and washing machine, and an overdue and unpaid balance of the purchase price
for said items in the amount of $574.17." 416 U.S. at 601.
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pose of or conceal the property, the writ issued."' The defendant
moved to dissolve the writ,'7 arguing that the seizure violated the
due process clauses of the state"' and federal"1' constitutions.'" Re-
jecting the defendant's argument, the Supreme Court held that the
Louisiana writ of sequestration is not violative of procedural due
process, as it effects a "constitutional accommodation of the respec-
tive interests of buyer and seller.""'
Distinguishing Louisiana's sequestration regime from the pre-
judgment wage garnishment statute at issue in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp." and the prejudgment replevin statutes involved in
Fuentes v. Shevin,"' the Court emphasized that the creditor's
remedies in Louisiana demanded judicial oversight.'" The Mitchell
Court's rationale was significant. The majority noted that Louisiana
law did not admit of prejudgment creditors' remedies without a
court order and, in light of the particular sequestration statute at
issue, sufficient protections were thought to be guaranteed to the
debtor. Procedural due process was satisfied notwithstanding the ex
parte nature of the writ hearing. For present purposes, Mitchell is
important in illustrating the means by which the Supreme Court
reached its decision. The majority seemed swayed by the Louisiana
scheme which interposes the judiciary between the creditor and the
176. Id.
177. Id. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3506.
178. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1921).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. 416 U.S. at 602. The debtor based his argument that the seizure was un-
constitutional on the twin grounds "that it had occurred without prior notice and op-
portunity to defend .. .[his) right to possession of the property." Id. In addition, the
debtor claimed that the items seized were exempt from seizure under state law. Id.
See LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1960 & 1980).
181. 416 U.S. at 610. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court. noted that '[tlhe
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally ap-
plicable to every imaginable situation.'" Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
650 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
182. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
183. 407 U.S. 67 1972).
184. The majority wrote that "Mitchell was not at the unsupervised mercy of the
creditor and court functionaries. The Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the
process from beginning to end." 416 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court
realized that one of the reasons for the sequestration writ "was that official interven-
tion would forestall violent self-help and retaliation." Id. at 606 (citing Millar, Judicial'
Sequestration in Louisiana. Some Account of Its Sources, 30 TUL. L. REv. 201, 206
(1966)).
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debtor.'" The question presented was whether the constitutional
procedural guarantees of due process had been afforded the debtor
deprived of his property prior to judgment. State action and the ap-
plicability of the fourteenth amendment was not an issue. The writ
was executed by a sheriff'" upon court order.'" Given that the
statutory scheme in Louisiana satisfied due process restrictions, a
fair implication from Mitchell is that the Louisiana procedure
benefited from the state's traditional rule prohibiting self-help.'u
However, should U.C.C. sections 9-503 and 9-504 be enacted in
Louisiana, a secured creditor could act as never before permitted,
seizing and selling the collateral without judicial approval.," Cer-
tainly, when the creditor unilaterally deiermines the default of the
debtor, beginning the process of repossession and sale, the pro-
cedural protections of due process, such as prior notice and an op-
portunity to be heard,'" are not satisfied. Yet, unless the private
creditor's use of the statutory repossesion plan is sufficient state ac-
tion to trigger the invocation of the fourteenth amendment, due pro-
cess is not a concern." ' As previously noted, ' the general view in
the common law states is that the passage of the U.C.C. with sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504 is not significant enough state involvement in
the creditor's remedies to demand application of the fourteenth
185. The Court reflected that
[tihe trial court also ruled that "the provisional seizure enforced through se-
questration" was not a denial of due process of law. "To the contrary." the trial
judge said, "plaintiff insured defendant's right to due process by proceeding in ac-
cordance with Louisiana Law as opposed to any type of self-help seizure which
would have denied defendant possession of his property without due process."
416 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
186. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 321-31. Article 321 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure directs the sheriff to "execute writs, mandates, orders and judgments" upon
order of the court.
187. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3501.
188. See note 185, supra. Concurring in Mitchell, Mr. Justice Powell stated that
"[the] determination of what due process requires in a given context depends on a con-
sideration of both the nature of the governmental function involved and the private in-
terests affected." 416 U.S. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly. 397
U.S. 254. 263-66 (1970): Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961)). With the issue framed in this fashion, Mr. Justice Powell concluded
that the Louisiana sequestration scheme satisfied the necessary prerequisites of
procedural due process. 416 U.S. at 627 (Powell, J., concurring).
189. The legislative sanction of self-help probably would be argued to be a delega-
tion of the state's authority to private persons. Huffmire, iupra note 36, at 330.
190. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
192. See notes 61-92. supra, and accompanying text.
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amendment.'" Sections 9-503 and 9-504 have been read as restating
the common commercial practice."' A similar rationale for upholding
the sections if incorporated into Louisiana law seems implausible.
Self-help historically has been rejected. A reference to one instance
in which the Civil Code permits the creditor to act without judicial
authorization dramatizes the extent to which self-help is a concept
totally without precedent in this state.
Article 3165 of the Civil Code provides one circumstance in
which the creditor may sell his security absent a judicial order: the
pledgee's right of private sale. "5 The power of private sale, however,
is applicable only with respect to the possessory security of pledge.
The civil law's disdain for private disruption of peaceable possession
is not contradicted in this instance; the pledgee is the possessor
of the security. In addition, the pledgee is under a fiduciary duty to
act fairly toward the pledgor. The pledgee must act "reasonably in
disposing of the property of the pledgor and the slightest hint of
self dealing or overreaching will cast in doubt the validity of his ac-
tions no matter how lawful they. may technically appear to be."'" By
noting the strict limitations on the pledgee's right of private sale,
one can reason that the restrictions exist due to the civil law's
general denial of non-judicial creditor's remedies. Even in the in-
stance when the creditor has possession of the security, the right of
private sale must be contractually conferred upon the pledgee;,"
"[tjhe pledgor is presumed to have waived nothing except what is
specifically waived."'" So the "jurisprudence is settled that in the
absence of an express waiver of the right to notice, the pledgor is
entitled, after demand for and default in payment, to reasonable
notice of the intention of the pledgee to sell the pledged property."'"
193. See Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.
1974); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1974);
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739
(2d Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906
(8th Cir. 1973). •
194. See, e.g., Del Duca, aupra note 26, at 345.
195. See T. HARRELL & K. VETTER, LOUISIANA SECURITY DEvicEs: CASES AND
MATERIALS 182 (1980).
196. l at 192. See, e.g., Alcolea v. Smith, IbO La. 482, 90 So. 769 (1921); Berry v.
American White Lead & Color Works, 107 La. 236, 31 So. 733 (1901); Elmer v. Elmer,
203 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
197. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3165.
198. Broussard v. O'Bryan, 270 So. 2d 127, 131 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (citing Smith
v. Shippers Oil Co., 120 La. 640, 45 So. 533 (1907); Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So. 2d 391 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967)).
199. Broussard v. O'Bryan, 270 So. 2d 127, 131 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). Further-
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In view of the strictures placed upon the pledgee's power of
private sale by the Civil Code and the Louisiana courts, and con-
sidering the civilian abhorrence of creditor self-help, it may be
forcefully argued that the procedural meaning of due process in this
jurisdiction includes judicial protection of debtors from privately in-
itiated seizures and sales. Thus, irrespective of a state action deter-
mination, necessary to trigger the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment, sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the U.C.C. could be challenged
as impermissible under the Louisiana Constitution.m Article I, sec-
tion 2 of the state constitution states that "No person shall be
deprived of ... property, except by due process of law." Embodied
in the terse constitutional language, as in article I, section 4,2' is a
strengthening of the protections of private property. Considering
the dual realities that the reach of the Louisiana Constitution is not
limited to governmental actions 2 and that "'self-help' . .. is shunned
by the courts," ' U.C.C sections 9-503 and 9-504 probably could not
withstand scrutiny, if enacted.
Conclusion
If state action, a necessary prerequisite for the implementation
of the due process protection of the United States Constitution,
means conduct traditionally associated with the government in a
particular jurisdiction then it should be of no moment that in the
majority of other states a practice has been privately controlled. In-
sofar as state action is truly a useful concept, the history of each
state should be reviewed to properly apply either the "nexus" ' or
the "public function"'" tests. That Louisiana may be the only United
States jurisdiction in which creditors do not enjoy self-help powers
should not alter the result that, under the accepted state action
standards, creditors now may not be legislatively charged with such
more. the lez commiaia,. a stipulation in the contract of pledge whereby the pledgee
may take the ownership of the collateral in the event of the pledgor's default, is pro-
hibited in Louisiana. Alcolea v. Smith, 150 La. 482, 90 So. 769 (1921).
200. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
201. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides, in part, that "Every person has the right to ac-
quire, own. control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property."
202. Cf. State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978) (a statement resulting from an
unreasonable search conducted by a private person acting under the guise of statutory
authority is inadmissible under article I, sections 1 and 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution); Note, State tx Nelson. Exclusion of Evidence Derived From a Private
Search, 89 LA. L. REv. 291 (1978).
203. Navratil v. Smart, 400 So. 2d 268, 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
204. See notes 41. 43, supra, and accompanying text.
205. See note 44. supra, and accompanying text.
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privileges. Indeed the conclusion is logical; Louisiana's heritage has
denied the concept of self-help. In this regard Louisiana is different
from common law jurisdictions. Enacting U.C.C. Sections 9-503 and
9-504 would not constitute a legislative codification of the prevailing
rule in Louisiana.
Nevertheless, the prevailing stance taken by the United States
Supreme Court seems to be one of ignoring historical practices in
the individual states.m Consequently, sections 9-503 and 9-504 possi-
bly may be held constitutional in any jurisdiction. Reasoning that
commercial uniformity is needed is admirable; however, seeming
business exigencies should not be permitted to circumvent constitu-
tional limitations. Announcing that the "historical antecedents"' of
a jurisdiction in question will not determine the state action ex-
amination greatly damages the analytical approach.
In Louisiana the incorporation may never occur. In the short run
the utility of such an enactment is dubious since it would likely prove
to be the catalyst for rounds of litigation. Assuming that the Feder.
al Constitution is interpreted so as to uphold 9-503 and 9-504, dif-
ficulties would remain under article I, section 2 of the Louisiana
Constitution. Unshackled by the state action limitation and as "a
flexible provision which gives the courts significant leeway in
developing standards of reasonableness, ' 'm article I, section 2 may
be viewed as an articulation of the civilian ideas of protection of
private property. If a Louisiana creditor, acting under the authority
of the U.C.C. in a manner historically associated with the govern-
ment, engages in self-help, such conduct should be deemed to be vio-
lative of the tenets of civilian due process.
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